ワクチン副作用情報 I thank an unknown cooperator.

There is no justice in war








 The Real Reason The US Is Bombing Iraq


ブランドンターベビル/ 活動家ポスト
Brandon Turbeville/Activist Post


 Only a day after Obama’s announcement that he had authorized “targeted strikes” inside Iraq in order to combat the Islamic State (IS) advance, the United States has indeed followed through with their threat.

少なくとも二つの波 の標的の多様性に対する空爆のは、すでにイラクの内部で行われた。の一つ 空爆は明らかに打た モルタル位置やエルビルの近くにある車列IS。戦闘機はエルビル、イラクのクルド地域の首都から半時間の距離内に進出していたされています。国防総省のスポークスマンによると、湾で空母から離陸した2 FA-18Sは、空爆に参加した。

 At least two waves of airstrikes against a variety of targets have already taken place inside Iraq.One of the airstrikes apparently struck an IS mortar position and an IS convoy near Erbil.IS fighters had advanced to within a half hour's distance from Erbil, the capital of Iraq's Kurdish region.According to a Pentagon spokesman, two FA-18s that took off from an aircraft carrier in the Gulf were involved in the airstrike.


 Obama stated that the strikes were necessary to prevent genocide, to protect Christians and other religious minorities whose lives are in danger, and to halt the IS advance.The airstrikes are the first that have been authorized in Iraq by the United States since 2011.

広大な押収する - 注目すべきは何ですか、しかし、ISISを許可した後に、今のアメリカの軍事行動を促している可能性が爆撃を開始、何を取り巻く状況は、(特に米国完全に、資金提供に向け、作成され、西日本の武装)イラク全体の領土の帯状。

 What is notable, however, are the circumstances surrounding the initiation of the bombing and what may have prompted American military action now, after allowing ISIS (entirely funded, directed, created, and armed by the West – notably the United States) to seize vast swaths of territory across Iraq.


 Why bomb Iraq now you might ask? And why bomb the area surrounding Erbil?

イラクのクルド地域 - - 「米国の石油会社のハブ」です。エルビルの周辺エリアには単純な事実でこの質問うその回答

 The answers to this question lie in the simple fact that the area surrounding Erbil – the Kurdish region of Iraq – is a “hub for US oil companies.”

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 Truman and the Hiroshima Cult




  The United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan in 1945 to end World War II as quickly and with as few casualties as possible. That is the compelling and elegantly simple argument Newman puts forward in his new study of World War II's end, "Truman and the Hiroshima Cult." According to Newman:


 (1) The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey conclusions that Japan was ready to surrender without "the Bomb" are fraudulent;


 (2) America's "unconditional surrender" doctrine did not significantly prolong the war; and (3) President Harry S. Truman's decision to use atomic weapons on Japanese cities was not a "racist act," nor was it a calculated political maneuver to threaten Joseph Stalin's Eastern hegemony.


 Simply stated, Newman argues that Truman made a sensible military decision. As commander in chief, he was concerned with ending a devastating and costly war as quickly as possible and with saving millions of lives. Yet, Newman goes further in his discussion, seeking the reasons why so much hostility has been generated by what happened in the skies over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August, 1945.


 The source of discontent, he concludes, is a "cult" that has grown up in the United States since the 1960s. It was weaned on the disillusionment spawned by concerns about a military industrial complex, American duplicity and failure in the Vietnam War, and a mistrust of government following Watergate.

 カルト神社、聖日、被害の特徴的なレトリック、聖書の様々なアイテム、そして、日本では、強力なマルクス主義選挙からサポートしています。 「他のカルトと同じように、それは歴史に無関心である」とニューマンは宣言しています。 「その信者は、宇宙の状態に逃亡し、典型的でないイベントを高める。

 The cult has a shrine, a holy day, a distinctive rhetoric of victimization, various items of scripture, and, in Japan, support from a powerful Marxist constituency. "As with other cults, it is ahistorical," Newman declares. "Its devotees elevate fugitive and unrepresentative events to cosmic status.


 And most of all, they believe." Newman's analysis goes to the heart of the process by which scholars interpret historical events and raises disturbing issues about the way historians select and distort evidence about the past to suit special political agendas.

 出版社: Michigan State Univ Pr (1995/08)



What if the Bomb Had Not Been Used?


©2013プロジェクトMUSE。によって生成ジョンズ·ホプキンス大学の出版 と共同でミルトンS.アイゼンハワー図書館

©2013 Project MUSE.Produced by The Johns Hopkins University Press in collaboration with The Milton S. Eisenhower Library.


トルーマンは、8月に原子爆弾を使用していなかった、他のすべての考慮、太平洋戦争の継続を曇らせる、紛れもない悪を生産していただろう。悪の程度は、戦争の期間に依存していただろう。広島カルト信者 '狂信は原子からの死傷者以外のすべてにそれらを盲目に。···

Overshadowing every other consideration, continuation of the Pacific War, had Truman not used atomic bombs in August, would have produced unmitigated evil.The extent of the evil would have depended on the duration of the war.Hiroshima cultists' fanaticism blinds them to everything except the casualties from the atom.···




Stephen Choate

Stephen Hodin

23 November 2010

The Other Day that Will Live in Infamy


  August 6, 1945, a day that perhaps may live in more infamy than Pearl Harbor Day, is the first day an atomic weapon was used in war, an action that would become the subject of many moral debates for years on end (BBC).


 A former soldier, Harry Truman took into account his experiences on the battlefield to determine the necessity of using such excessive force, and ultimately came down in favor of using the weapon, for the sake of preventing further casualties (Hamby). Although there are certainly reasons to oppose the use of the weapon, reasons Truman himself admitted to, the former U.S. President felt the benefits of using the weapon outweighed the negative effects, both tactically and morally (Newman 115).


 A principal reason for the use of the atomic bomb is the unrelenting nature of the Japanese military, a military that in its day would fight till the end for the sake of honor (Newman 66). Was the use of excessive force needed to stave off many more casualties?


 The atomic bomb, seen as a “necessary evil”, was used by truman for the sake of limiting American and Japanese casualties, and to bring an end to a long, bloody war. Though almost no one doubts the overall immorality of Truman’s use of the atomic bomb, opponents of the bomb fail to realize the greater immorality of potentially allowing one of the bloodiest wars since the Civil War to continue to rage on.


 As the war in Japan had raged on for many months, Americans and Japanese alike were facing severe casualties in very small battles. Death totals were staggering for battles over insignificant portions of land, as Americans were fighting Kamikaze pilots, willing to lose their own lives if it meant taking down an American soldier in the process. Perhaps the greatest example of excessive casualty levels is the battle of Okinawa.


 Author of Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, Robert P. Newman writes: “American forces recorded 12,520 killed or missing, 36,631 wounded, and 93 missing in taking an area half the size of Rhode Island that the Japanese could not resupply or reinforce. (4)” Rhode Island is 1,214 square miles, while Japan is 145,883 square miles (http://sos.ri.gov/, http://www.dimensionsinfo.com/).


 Granted, Okinawa may be an important military vantage point, both positionally and in regards to infrastructure access, but so many lives were lost for such a small plot of land. Hanson Baldwin, a pulitzer-prize winning military journalist for the New York Times, wrote of the battle at Okinawa:


  “In size, scope and ferocity, it dwarfed the Battle of Britain. Never before had there been, probably never again will there be, such a vicious, sprawling struggle of planes against planes, of ships against planes.

決して前に、非常に短いスペースで、海軍は非常に多くの船を失っていた。これまでにない土地の戦闘でそんなにアメリカの血がそう簡単に言えば非常に小さい面積の時間を当てるしていた···があり、より大きな陸上戦、より長期の空気のキャンペーンでしたが、沖縄最大の複合操作、「NO四半期でしてきた「海と陸の下と上で、上で戦った苦労しています。 (ニューマン経由、4) "

 Never before, in so short a space, had the Navy lost so many ships; never before in land fighting had so much American blood been shed in so short a time in so small an area... There have been larger land battles, more protracted air campaigns, but Okinawa was the largest combined operation, a “no- quarter” struggle fought on, under and over the sea and the land. (Via Newman, 4)”

日本の地上戦闘の厳しさを調べるときに原子爆弾の使用による流血が突然はるかに少ない悲劇的に見えます。流血のアカウントボールドウィンの口座に入れたときだけでなく、質問がポップアップ表示され、 "どのように多くのより多くの生命は?失われた可能性があります」だけでなく、性の問題はない」、この戦争は上吹き荒れている可能性がどれくらい長い?"

 The bloodshed from the use of the atomic bomb suddenly looks a lot less tragic when examining the severity of ground battles in Japan. When taking into account Baldwin’s account of the bloodshed, not only does the question “how many more lives may have been lost?” pop up, but also the question of “how much longer could this war have raged on?”


 The United States military was stretched, occupying both the Japanese war and the war in Europe against Hitler, an extended, high-casualty war may have been too much for the American military to effectively handle. The American military could have very well begun to lose ground should the war continue to rage on, as reserves and supplies dwindled. Any loss of position could have been a great setback in progress, leading to more bloody months of battle.


 One of the key topics for discussion among atomic bomb critics is the possibility that Japan may have been preparing to surrender to the United States in the weeks leading up to the use of the bomb (Newman, 33). Newman states:

 「日本に対する原爆のハリー·トルーマンの使用への攻撃のための最も重要な基盤は、従来の爆撃や海上封鎖は1945年の夏までに降伏点に日本を持ってきて、連合国はただじっとして待つことができるようしていたという主張である。原爆、戦争にソ連のエントリ、また侵略どちらも必要であった。 (33)」

 “The most important foundation for attacks on Harry Truman’s use of atomic bombs against Japan is the claim that conventional bombing and naval blockade had brought Japan to the point of surrender by the summer of 1945, and that the Allies could just sit tight and wait. Neither atomic bombs, Soviet entry into the war, nor invasion were necessary. (33)”


 A fact not known to many, is that on August 8th, due to violations of agreements between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Soviets had declared war on Japan (History.com). If the Japanese did not respond to involvement of another superpower after being faced with the first atomic bomb (the second bomb, on Nagasaki, was to follow a day later on August 9), it seems very unlikely that they were anywhere close to prepared to surrender without the use of the bomb (DOE.gov).


 In Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, Newman quotes Paul Nitze, a board director of Roosevelt’s USSBS initiative to study the atomic bomb, in saying: “We weren’t going to accomplish a damn thing by a ground invasion.


 These fellows were going to fight to the last man and if we were against that kind of thing, fighting to the last man on the ground, I thought the estimate of 500,000 U.S. casualties was a gross underestimate. (37)” While the outlook for America may have been better than expected heading into August 1945, the unrelenting, proud mentality of the Japanese military had a lot left to fight before giving into surrender, and there is little evidence to suggest Japan was ready to surrender outside of speculation (Newman 33).


 Is a longer lasting, bloodier, costlier war that left many at home worried about their loved ones for longer, really a more moral war? Many American soldiers were drafted into World War II, not volunteers.


 Stemming from the Japanese’s dim positions in mid 1945 is the debate over whether or not surrender needed to be forced from the Japanese, that is, the debate over the necessity of “unconditional surrender”. The Potsdam Declaration was submitted to the Japanese on July 26, 1945, with a number of clear statements of American intent (Newman 57).


 The Potsdam Declaration opened with threats of escalated violence against the Japanese (effectively further threatening the Japanese, as at this point, the United States did have a military advantage). Where the term “unconditional” begins to play a diminished role, is in the terms promised to Japan, not asked of Japan. As Newman writes of the promises to Japan:

 「...武装軍が帰国し、生産的な生活につながることが認められる。スピーチ、宗教、思想の自由が確立されるだろう。民間の産業が認められる。国際貿易は、最終的に認められる。新政府が設立されたと連合軍の占領が終わったことになる。 (70)」

 “...the disarmed military would be permitted to return home and lead to productive lives; freedom of speech, religion, and thought would be established; civilian industries would be permitted; international trade would be permitted eventually; and the Allied occupation would be ended when the new government was established. (70)”

しかしニューマンはあっても6-98月の衝撃の後、軍幹部が自分の全く受け入れられない条件を除いて投降したがらなかった」と述べている。 (73)は「少数派平和党を除いて、日本のリーダーシップは、したがって、(ニューマン72)降伏を強制するために十分大きな力を必要とする、平和の名のもとに一切の妥協をすることが主に不本意だった。アメリカは日本に非常に公平だっ降伏を提案したが、このオファーは露骨に拒否された場合は、トルーマンは、それが必要な日本の降伏を誘導するあまり平和的、道徳的な手段を追求することがわかった。

 Yet Newman states that “Even after the shocks of 6-9 August, military leaders were unwilling to surrender except on their totally unacceptable terms. (73)” The leadership of Japan, with the exception of the minority Peace Party, was largely unwilling to make any compromises in the name of peace, therefore requiring force great enough to force surrender (Newman 72). Although America proposed a surrender that was very fair to Japan, this offer was blatantly refused, in which case, Truman found it necessary to pursue less peaceful and moral means of inducing Japanese surrender.


 Three days after the bombing on Hiroshima, the “Bock’s Car” B-29 dropped the “Fat Boy” on Nagasaki. Even if one use of grave and deadly force was necessary, was Truman’s use of a second atomic bomb excessive, or enough force needed to force surrender? Robert P. Newman sheds light on this issue, making a great statement about the preparedness of the Japanese to surrender on August 9th:


 “Many commentators hold that the Japanese government did not have adequate time to settle on surrender in the three days between Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and if it had had more time, the war would have ended without dropping the second bomb.

誰がこの時間を使用し、どのように、軍事の岩リブ付き反対を克服するために説明されることはありませんでしょう。 (105)「何が、その後、日本政府に降伏を検討する十分な時間を与えることなく、こんなに早く二爆弾を投下してトルーマンと彼の政権の動機でしたか?

 Who would have used this time, and how, to overcome the rock-ribbed opposition of the military is never explained. (105)”What, then, was the motivation for Truman and his administration to drop the second bomb so quickly, without giving the Japanese government ample time to consider a surrender?

おそらくそれは、単一の爆弾が降伏の思考を誘導することが期待されていないことを政権内での理解だった。 「広島の前に、彼らは核攻撃は数日から数週間で降伏を産生する、あるいは8月にとは考えていなかった。 「ニューマンが書いているように、「(ニューマン105を介してバーンスタイン)はこの悲観論は、「(105)...に爆弾の力を過小評価し、部分的に非常によく当てはまる可能性がある文であったが、この力を使用することの波及効果を正当化するために必要な。

 Perhaps it was the understanding within the administration that a single bomb was not expected to induce thoughts of surrender. “Before Hiroshima, they did not believe that the nuclear attacks would produce a surrender within a few days or weeks, or even in August. (Bernstein via Newman 105)” As Newman writes, “This pessimism was partly due to underestimating the bomb’s power... (105)”, a statement that may very well be true, but the ramifications of using this force needed to be justified.


 The use of the bomb, only to not end up forcing surrender, would have caused many adverse affects. The first of negative affects would have been putting American soldiers at risk. As a former soldier, Truman was heavily motivated to limit further American casualties, and get American men out of harm’s way (Hamby). This is perhaps the shakiest of grounds for moral justification of the atomic bomb, however, although one bomb may have induced surrender, if it did not, it would be a horrific moral tragedy, the use of nuclear force on innocent civilians, with no change in outcome.


 President Truman was acting definitively to end the war, to limit casualties, for any action that would stave off further casualties at this point was the moral decision.
The general morality of the atomic bomb is often called into question, aside from debates over its tactical military use, and their individual moral justifications.

ニューマンは述べています。「いいえジレンマや道徳曖昧さが彼らのために存在していない:トルーマンの決定を明確にし、紛れもなく不道徳だった。 (105)は「守ることは非常に困難にして爆弾の使用を特定の不道徳な側面があっても、その軍事的支持者の中でありました。ニューマンの本からの抜粋は、市民を意図的に前に見たことがない数字に害を与えたかについて語っています:

 Newman states: “No dilemma or moral ambiguity exists for them: Truman’s decision was clearly and unquestionably immoral. (105)” There were certain immoral aspects of the bomb’s use that make it very difficult to defend, even among its military supporters. An excerpt from Newman’s book speaks about how citizens were intentionally harmed in never before seen numbers:

 「いくつかの日本​​に対する原爆の使用を非難た第2のグランドは、非戦闘員免疫の原則に違反していることである。このような爆弾がターゲットや戦闘部隊に限定することができません。トルーマンと彼のアドバイザーは女性と子どもの数千は、人のほとんどが戦争を起訴に従事していなかったことを知っていた、殺されることになる。 (116)」

  “A second ground on which some condemn the use of atomic bombs against the Japanese is that it violated the principle of non-combatant immunity. Such bombs cannot be targeted or restricted to fighting forces. Truman and his advisors knew that thousands of women and children, most of whom were not engaged in prosecuting the war, would be killed. (116)”


 It would be very difficult to make the claim that no moral atrocities were committed by using the atomic bomb, but unfortunately, these moral atrocities were necessary in bringing a swift, certain end to a war for a country that was already fatigued by great casualties and in Germany.


 Large casualties like Okinawa could not continue to occur, with 405,399 American casualties being reported for the entire war (fas.org). As a former soldier, and American commander in chief, President Truman was acting in judgement for what was best for the American soldier and the American homeland, putting the morality of extreme force second to the needs of America.


 Perhaps the best way to justify Truman’s seemingly immoral actions is to look at the alternatives. What if the United States continued the foot battle, what if we didn’t use the bomb?


 Robert Newman’s final chapter makes a very bold statement about the future of the war without use of the bomb, “Overshadowing every other consideration, continuation of the Pacific War, had Truman not used atomic bombs in August, would have produced unmitigated evil.


 The extent of the evil would have depended on the duration of the war.” Constant fighting to the death, without a force for either side to realize huge losses, could very well have ended up in a greater total loss of life. It is truly impossible to make a definite claim to that effect, though Newman, using US death rates, claims that they will, “These things together would have produced monthly death rates well in excess of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki total.


 (185)” And with the resilience of Japanese soldiers, there may not have been an end in sight (Newman 66). Using Paul Nitze’s estimated date for Japanese surrender without use of the atomic bomb, November 1st, Newman believes that the turns in the war would have been much graver than the use of the bomb was. Some examples of devastation that would have occurred in just three months include: deteriorated POW camps, large bouts of starvation, continued battle casualties, the casualties of many innocent civilians by routine bombings (Newman 185).


 President Truman’s use of the atomic can be seen as the epitome of the expression, a necessary evil. Was Truman’s decision of questionable morality? Sure, but acting as a former soldier, President Truman was doing what was best for America and America’s men at arms.


  It is critically important that as history makes it easier and easier to sit back as an armchair general, Americans see the logic behind Truman’s decision at the time, based on the intelligence he had. In doing so, it will become clear that Truman’s intent was not immoral, but doing what he thought is best.

ニューマンは彼の本の中で述べているように、「広島カルト信者'狂信は原子からの死傷者以外のすべてにそれらを盲目に。 (185)は「ニューマンの文では、詳細な分析を締結するに、爆弾を使用していないことの影響といえば、この必要悪がトルーマンの目には正当化された理由のための大きいケースになります。それは多くの命が爆弾の使用から失われた悲しい事実である?はい。

 As Newman states in his book, “Hiroshima cultists’ fanaticism blinds them to everything except the casualties from the atom. (185)” Newman’s statement, in concluding a detailed analysis, speaking of the ramifications of not using the bomb, makes a great case for why this necessary evil was justified in the eyes of Truman. Is it a saddening fact that many lives were lost from the use of the bomb? Yes.


  But it is also a very saddening fact that many lives were lost due to other battles in the war. It may be a sad reality that President Truman used two atomic bombs on Japan, but it may have staved off many more months of war, and long term affects that could have easily dwarfed the consequences of the atomic bomb.
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Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II

       田中利幸、1998 / Toshiyuki Tanaka, 1998






Hirosima and nagasaki that were killed in cult

Truman and the Hiroshima Cult

Japan was killed in cult

Hiroshima Cult

The Cult of Hiroshima

Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II,

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